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Abstract 
 The present paper reports two results. It is shown that the formula 
  𝑃(𝑥) = ∀y∀z[¬𝐺(𝑥, 𝑦) → ¬𝑀(𝑧)]  
provides the logic underlying gauge symmetry, where 𝑀 denotes the predicate of being massive. 
For the logic of spontaneous symmetry breaking, we have 
  𝑃(𝑥) = ∀y∀z[𝐷(𝑥, 𝑦) → 𝑀(𝑧)]  
Notice that the above two formulas are not logically equivalent. The results are obtained by 
integrating four components, namely, gauge symmetry and Higgs mechanism in quantum field 
theory, and Gödel’s incompleteness theorem and Tarski’s indefinability theorem in mathematical 
logic.  Gödel numbering is the key for arithmetic modeling applied in this paper.  
 
1. Introduction 
 The standard model of particle physics is a well-developed and well-documented 
theoretical framework. Gauge field theory is the main language adopted in this standard model [1]. 
Gauge symmetry is an essential systematic property of gauge theoretic modeling, and spontaneous 
symmetry breaking by Higgs mechanism is the key methodology to supplement the standard model. 
The standard model has successfully reached some general systematic conclusions. Nonetheless, 
the metalogic underlying these conclusions has not been spelled out and still remains unclear.  
 This paper aims to spell out the meta-logical properties underlying the systematic 
conclusions reached by the standard model of particle physics. Two results will be reported. The 
first result is about the underlying metalogic of gauge symmetry, showing that the notion of 
massiveness is indefinable. This result is obtained by integrating the techniques used by Gödel’s 
incompleteness theorem [3] and Tarski’s indefinability theorem [5]. The second result is about 
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spontaneous symmetry breaking. Gödel numbering will be introduced, as it is the key to the first-
order characterization of Lagrangian. The necessary backgrounds of Gödel’s theorem and Tarski’s 
theorem are given in the appendix.  
 
2. Gödel numbering and first-order characterization 
 Mathematical language always deals with symbols, formulas, and derivations. For a 
mathematical framework, even though its base domains (such as real or complex fields) are 
uncountable infinities (i.e., the continuum), the number of symbols used to denote variables, 
functions, operators, etc., is infinite but countably many. Thus, we can have an effective procedure 
to mechanically assign a unique odd number to each and every symbol in order, called Gödel 
number. For a given symbol e, its Gödel number can be written as 𝑔(𝑒), which can be seen as a 
function or an odd number. A formula is a finite string of symbols, written as 
 𝐿 = 𝑒1𝑒2 … … 𝑒𝑛 
The Gödel number of a formula can be calculated by 
 𝑔(𝐿) = 𝑞1
𝑔(𝑒1)𝑞2
𝑔(𝑒2) … … 𝑞𝑛
𝑔(𝑒𝑛) 
where 𝑞𝑖 is the first i prime numbers in its natural order, and 𝑔(𝑒𝑖) is the Gödel number of the 
ith symbol in the formula L. A derivation is a finite sequence of formulas, written as  
 𝐷𝑒𝑟(𝐿) ≡ < 𝑢1, 𝑢2, … … , 𝑢𝑚 > 
The Gödel number of a derivation can be calculated by 
 𝑔[(𝐷𝑒𝑟(𝐿)] = 𝑞1
𝑔(𝑢1)𝑞2
𝑔(𝑢2) … 𝑞𝑖
𝑔(𝑢𝑖) … 𝑞𝑚
𝑔(𝑢𝑚) 
where 𝑔(𝑢𝑖) is the Gödel number of the ith formula in the derivation sequence. The Gödel number 
of any given formula or derivation is always an even number, which is also a composite number.  
 The above method is called Gödel numbering [3]. The beauty and power of Gödel 
numbering is that, based on the fundamental theorem of arithmetic (i.e., the unique decomposition 
theorem of primes), from a given Gödel number we can uniquely recapture the original derivation, 
the original formula, or the original symbol used in the context. 
 Note that logic has nothing to do with the content. So that the first-order characterization 
of the Lagrangian only requires three conditions. First, the Lagrangian represented by a Gödel 
number. Second, any given derivation of a particular kind and its Gödel number can be used 
interchangeably. Third, It allows to introduce new predicates or function terms.  
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3. Gauge Particles and the Indefinability of Massiveness 
 This section will proceed as follows. First, the general conclusion reached from physics is 
summarized as a statement. Second, the Indefinability Theorem of Massiveness is stated and the 
sketch of its proof is shown. Lastly, some comments on this theorem are provided. 
 Statement of physics: The standard model of particle physics is the composite of three 
gauge symmetry groups: 𝑈(1) × 𝑆𝑈(2) × 𝑆𝑈(3). The gauge symmetry implies that all the gauge 
particles, including gauge fermions and gauge bosons, are massless. 
 The Indefinability Theorem of Massiveness: Under the first-order characterization of the 
standard model, massiveness is indefinable within its gauge theoretic modeling. In other words, 
the predicate “being massive”, denoted by M, has no model; i.e., the model of massive predicate 
is null.  
 In the following, we sketch the proof of this theorem. Let L be the Lagrangian of a particle,  
 𝐿 = −
1
4
𝐹𝜇𝑣𝐹
𝜇𝑣 + (𝐷𝜇𝜑)
†𝐷𝜇𝜑 − 𝜇
2(𝜑†𝜑) + 𝜆(𝜑†𝜑)2    (1) 
There is no explicit mass term in this Lagrangian, therefore it is sometimes called a massless 
Lagrangian. Let the Gödel number of L be 𝑔(𝐿) = 𝑖. Now we assume there was a derivation (a 
transformation) from L to 𝐿𝑚, where 𝐿𝑚 is a Lagrangian with mass terms (also known as a massive 
Lagrangian). Denote such a derivation by 𝐷𝑒𝑟(𝐿, 𝐿𝑚). This derivation would have a Gödel number, 
𝑔[𝐷𝑒𝑟(𝐿, 𝐿𝑚)] = 𝑗, and the end formula 𝐿𝑚 would have its own Gödel number 𝑔(𝐿𝑚) = 𝑘. 
 Now we introduce an arithmetic relation, 𝒢(𝑖, 𝑗), which by the definition of expressibility 
can be expressed by the term 𝐺(𝒊, 𝒋). In addition, we introduce a new predicate of “being massive”, 
denoted by M. Then we consider the formula below 
 𝑃(𝑥) = ∀y∀z[¬𝐺(𝑥, 𝑦) → ¬𝑀(𝑧)]       (2) 
Substituting the variables by the corresponding Gödel numbers introduced above, we have 
 𝑆(𝒊, 𝒋, 𝒌) = ¬𝐺(𝒊, 𝒋) → ¬𝑀(𝒌)       (3) 
By the statement of physics, there is no such a derivation from L to 𝐿𝑚. Hence, 𝒢(𝑖, 𝑗) is actually 
false; since 𝒢(𝑖, 𝑗)  is expressible by 𝐺(𝒊, 𝒋), we then have ¬𝐺(𝒊, 𝒋)  from the definition of 
expressibility. Then by propositional logic, we can infer ¬𝑀(𝒌).  Now assume for contradiction 
that M had a model: 
 𝑋 = {𝑘 | 𝑘 = 𝑔(𝐿𝑚), 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝐿𝑚 𝑠𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑠𝑓𝑖𝑒𝑠 𝑀}      (4) 
Then, because 𝐿𝑚 was supposed to be massive, we would have that 𝑘 ∈ 𝑋; while by ¬𝑀(𝒌), we 
would have 𝑘 ∉ 𝑋. This is a contradiction. In other words, 𝑋 must be a null model of M, meaning 
that the massiveness is indefinable within the gauge theoretic language adopted by the standard 
model of particle physics. QED.  
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4. Higgs Mechanism and Definability of Massiveness 
 The Higgs mechanism is responsible for causing local gauge symmetry spontaneously to 
be broken. Because local symmetry involves gauge field, which is massless when the local 
symmetry is unbroken, spontaneous local gauge symmetry breaking will make a gauge field 
massive.  There are many massless Lagrangians, and we can also make up many massive 
Lagrangians; which can be connected to which, depend on whether a derivation is available. This 
should be the meaning of definability for being massive.  
 Higgs mechanism can be characterized by making four points. First, to force a complex 
scalar field to be a real field by letting the imaginative part to be zero, and the resulting real scalar 
field is seen as a ground state, or a vacuum. Second, to introduce another real scalar field, called 
Higgs field, which causes the fluctuation of the ground state; it is a kind of perturbation. Third, as 
the result of perturbation, the local symmetry will be broken, and produce a massless field, called 
Goldstone field. Forth, the Goldstone field will be annihilated, and it somehow returns back to 
make the gauge field massive. And finally, the mass terms with gauge field usually are eventually 
constituted by potential parameters and coupling constants. As Ooguri [4] points out, Higgs 
mechanism does not tell us what is mass; it derives mass as if it exists. The theorem below shows 
the logic of Higgs mechanism. 
 𝑃(𝑥) = ∀y∀z[𝐷(𝑥, 𝑦) → 𝑀(𝑧)]        (5)  
Note that this formula is not logically equivalent to (1). We sketch a proof in the following. To 
restate the notations used in previous section, let the Gödel number of L be 𝑔(𝐿) = 𝑖 , 
𝑔[𝐷𝑒𝑟(𝐿, 𝐿𝑚)] = 𝑗  , and 𝑔(𝐿𝑚) = 𝑘.  𝐷(𝑥, 𝑦)  expresses the binary relation d(𝑔(𝐿), 𝑔(𝐿𝑚)]  if 
𝐷𝑒𝑟(𝐿, 𝐿𝑚)] holds. Substituting the variables by the corresponding Gödel numbers introduced 
above, we have 
 𝑆(𝒊, 𝒌, 𝒋) = 𝐷(𝒊, 𝒌) → 𝑀(𝒋)        (6) 
Note that different from (2), here Godel numbers 𝒌 and  𝒋 have switched the places, reflecting our 
view that the mass is defined by a derivation. Then by propositional logic, we can infer that 
𝑀(𝒋).  Now assume that M had a model  
 𝑋 = {𝑗 | 𝑗 = 𝑔[𝐷𝑒𝑟(𝐿, 𝐿𝑚)]}        (7) 
Many documented results in physics proved that this model is not null. To complete the existential 
proof, we provide an example below, of which the derivation is partly taken from Aitchison [1]. 
This example is about Higgs field itself, which is straightforward, and for reader’s convenience, it 
is spelled out step by step without any omission. During the derivation, the key formulas are 
numbered by (Hi), definitions are numbered by (Dj), and step formulas are not numbered. 
Notations and definitions are listed below.  
 𝜑 = 𝜌𝑒𝑖𝜃,  𝜑† = 𝜌𝑒−𝑖𝜃        (D1), (D2) 
     
  𝐷𝜇𝜑 = (𝜕𝜇 − 𝑖𝑒𝐴𝜇)𝜑,  (𝐷𝜇𝜑)
† = (𝜕𝜇 + 𝑖𝑒𝐴𝜇)𝜑    (D3), (D4) 
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 𝜌 =
1
√2
(𝑣 + 𝜒),              𝑣 = √
𝜇2
𝜆
       (D5), (D6) 
 𝐵𝜇 ≡ 𝐴𝜇 −
1
𝑒
𝜕𝜇 , 𝑀 = 𝑣𝑒                  (D7), (D8) 
Consider a massless Langrangian 
 ℒ = −
1
4
𝐹𝜇𝜈𝐹
𝜇𝜈 + (𝐷𝜇𝜑)
†𝐷𝜇𝜑 + 𝜇
2𝜑†𝜑 − 𝜆(𝜑†𝜑)
2
                                                    (H1) 
Since  𝜑†𝜑 = 𝜌𝑒−𝑖𝜃𝜌𝑒𝑖𝜃 = 𝜌2𝑒0 = 𝜌2      
𝐷𝜇𝜑 = (𝜕𝜇 − 𝑖𝑒𝐴𝜇)𝜌𝑒
𝑖𝜃 = 𝜕𝜇(𝜌𝑒
𝑖𝜃) − 𝑖𝜌𝑒𝐴𝜇𝑒
𝑖𝜃 = 𝑒𝑖𝜃𝜕𝜇 𝜌 + 𝜌𝜕𝜇(𝑒
𝑖𝜃) − 𝑖𝜌𝑒𝐴𝜇𝑒
𝑖𝜃 
                            = 𝑒𝑖𝜃𝜕𝜇 𝜌 + 𝑒
𝑖𝜃𝑖𝜌𝜕𝜇 𝜃 − 𝑖𝜌𝑒𝐴𝜇𝑒
𝑖𝜃 = 𝑒𝑖𝜃[𝜕𝜇 𝜌 + 𝑖𝜌(𝜕𝜇 𝜃 − 𝑒𝐴𝜇)] 
  (𝐷𝜇𝜑)
†𝐷𝜇𝜑 = 𝑒
−𝑖𝜃𝑒𝑖𝜃[𝜕𝜇 𝜌 + 𝑖𝜌(𝜕𝜇 𝜃 − 𝑒𝐴𝜇)] [𝜕𝜇 𝜌 − 𝑖𝜌(𝜕𝜇 𝜃 − 𝑒𝐴𝜇)] 
                             = [𝜕𝜇 𝜌 + 𝑖𝜌(𝜕𝜇 𝜃 − 𝑒𝐴𝜇)] [𝜕𝜇 𝜌 − 𝑖𝜌(𝜕𝜇 𝜃 − 𝑒𝐴𝜇) 
             = (𝜕𝜇 𝜌)
2 + 𝜌2(𝜕𝜇 𝜃 − 𝑒𝐴𝜇)
2 
 𝜑†𝜑 = 𝜇2𝜌2 
 𝜆(𝜑†𝜑)
2
= 𝜆(𝜌2)2 = 𝜆𝜌4 
(H1)   ⇒    ℒ = −
1
4
𝐹𝜇𝜈𝐹
𝜇𝜈
+ 𝜌
2
(𝜕𝜇 𝜃 − 𝑒𝐴𝜇)
2 + (𝜕𝜇 𝜌)
2 + 𝜇2𝜌2 −  𝜆𝜌4                                       (H2) 
Since (𝜕𝜇 𝜌)
2 = [𝜕𝜇
1
√2
(𝑣 + 𝜒)]2 =
1
2
[𝜕𝜇(𝑣 + 𝜒)]
2 =
1
2
(𝜕𝜇𝑣 + 𝜕𝜇𝜒)
2 
                 =
1
2
(𝜕𝜇√
𝜇2
𝜆
+ 𝜕𝜇𝜒)
2 =
1
2
(0 + 𝜕𝜇𝜒)
2 =
1
2
(𝜕𝜇𝜒)
2 
 𝜌2(𝜕𝜇 − 𝑒𝐴𝜇)
2 = 𝜌2[𝑒 (𝐴𝜇 −
1
𝑒
𝜕𝜇)]
2 = 𝜌2𝑒2𝐵2 
 𝜌2 = [
1
√2
(𝑣 + 𝜒)]2 =
1
2
(𝑣 + 𝜒)2 =
1
2
𝑣2 + 𝑣𝜒 +
1
2
𝜒2 
 𝜌2𝑒2𝐵2 = (
1
2
𝑣2 + 𝑣𝜒 +
1
2
𝜒2) 𝑒2𝐵2 =
1
2
𝑣2𝑒2𝐵2 + 𝑒2𝑣𝜒𝐵2 +
1
2
𝑒2𝜒2𝐵2 
                               =
1
2
𝑀2𝐵2 + 𝑒2𝑣𝜒𝐵2 +
1
2
𝑒2𝜒2𝐵2,                                 
(H2) ⇒     ℒ = −
1
4
𝐹𝜇𝜈𝐹
𝜇𝜈 +
1
2
𝑀2𝐵2 + 𝑒2𝑣𝜒𝐵2 +
1
2
𝑒2𝜒2𝐵2 +
1
2
(𝜕𝜇𝜒)
2 + 𝜇2𝜌2 −  𝜆𝜌4       (H3)               
Since  𝜇2𝜌2 = 𝜇2(
𝜒+𝑣
√2
)2 =
1
2
𝜇2(𝜒 + 𝑣)2 
   =
1
2
𝜇2(𝜒2 + 𝑣2 + 2𝜒𝑣) =
1
2
𝜇2𝜒2 +
1
2
𝜇2𝑣2 + 𝜇2𝜒𝑣  
   =
1
2
𝜇2𝜒2 +
1
2𝜆
𝜇4 + 𝜇2√
𝜇2
𝜆
𝜒 =
1
2
𝜇2𝜒2 +
1
2𝜆
𝜇4 + 𝜇3𝜒
1
√𝜆
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  𝜆𝜌4 = −𝜆(
𝑣+𝜒
√2
)4 = −
𝜆
4
(𝑣 + 𝜒)4 = −
𝜆
4
[(𝑣 + 𝜒)2]2  
                = −
𝜆
4
(𝜒2 + 𝑣2 + 2𝜒𝑣)2 = −
𝜆
4
[(𝜒2 + 𝑣2) + 2𝜒𝑣]2 
   = −
𝜆
4
[(𝜒2 + 𝑣2)2 + 4𝜒𝑣(𝜒2 + 𝑣2) + 4𝜒2𝑣2]  
   = −
𝜆
4
(𝜒4 + 𝑣4 + 2𝜒2𝑣2 + 4𝑣𝜒3 + 4𝜒𝑣3 + 4𝜒2𝑣2)  
                              = −
𝜇4
4𝜆
−
𝜆
4
𝜒4 −
1
2
𝜇2𝜒2 − 𝜇3𝜒
1
√𝜆
− √𝜆𝜇𝜒3 − 𝜇2𝜒2  
  𝜇2𝜌2 −  𝜆𝜌4 =
1
2
𝜇2𝜒2 +
1
2𝜆
𝜇4 + 𝜇3𝜒
1
√𝜆
−
𝜇4
4𝜆
−
𝜆
4
𝜒4 −
1
2
𝜇2𝜒2 − 𝜇3𝜒
1
√𝜆
− √𝜆𝜇𝜒3 − 𝜇2𝜒2 
   =
𝜇4
4𝜆
−
𝜆
4
𝜒4 − √𝜆𝜇𝜒3 − 𝜇2𝜒2  
(H3) ⇒     ℒ = −
1
4
𝐹𝜇𝜈𝐹
𝜇𝜈 +
1
2
𝑀2𝐵2 + 𝑒2𝑣𝜒𝐵2 +
1
2
𝑒2𝜒2𝐵2 
                                 +
1
2
(𝜕𝜇𝜒)
2 +
𝜇4
4𝜆
−
𝜆
4
𝜒4 − √𝜆𝜇𝜒3 − 𝜇2𝜒2                                                              (H4)  
 
Notice the second term on the right side of the equation, the free gauge field 𝐵2 is with a mass 
term 𝑀2. H4 is a massive Lagrangian. Thus, for this derivation, we observe that 𝐷𝑒𝑟(𝐿, 𝐿𝑚) holds; 
therefore, for  𝑗 = 𝑔[𝐷𝑒𝑟(𝐿, 𝐿𝑚)], 𝑗 ∈ 𝑋. In other words, since its model X is satisfiable, the mass 
predicate M is definable. QED.  
 
5. General discussion 
 Quantum field theory has successfully generated a number of general conclusions. It seems 
meaningful to disclose the logical forms of these conclusions. The formal representation of these 
conclusions would also enable us to address formal issues of these metalogical properties. Gödel 
numbering method seems useful as well as powerful to look at these issues from formal arithmetic 
perspectives. The results are obtained by integrating the twin theorems by Gödel and Tarski, which 
are briefly introduced in Appendix.  
 
Appendix  Twin theorems of Gödel and Tarski 
 We assume readers are familiar with the first order logic (PL), the first order theory (𝓝), 
and the arithmetic theory (N). Intuitive natural numbers used in N are given by 𝑛 , and the 
corresponding enumerers used in 𝓝 are denoted by bold 𝒏. Enumerers are constructed by starting 
from the empty set ∅ and the so-called successor function, such that ∅ = 𝟎, { ∅} = 𝟏, {∅, {∅}} =
𝟐 , and so forth. In the following, we introduce Godel’s theorem first, and Tarski’s theorem second.   
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Definition of Expressibility: If 𝑅(𝑎1, … , 𝑎𝑛) holds in N, then 𝑃(𝒂𝟏, … , 𝒂𝒏) is provable in 
𝓝. If 𝑅(𝑎1, … , 𝑎𝑛) does not hold in N, then ¬𝑃(𝒂𝟏, … , 𝒂𝒏) is provable in 𝓝.  
 Definition of Consistency: For any given formula "𝐿" in 𝓝, either 𝐿 is provable, or else ¬𝐿 
is provable, but not both.  
 For a given formula “L”, denote its proof by Bew(L). Assume 𝑔(𝐿) = 𝑖 and 𝑔(𝐵𝑒𝑤(𝐿)) =
𝑗, where 𝑖 and 𝑗 are Gödel numbers. We introduce a relation 𝒢(𝑖, 𝑗) in 𝑵, and define a function 
term 𝐺(𝒊, 𝒋) in 𝓝. Gödel constructed a formula,   
 𝑃(𝑥) = ∀𝑦¬𝐺(𝑥, 𝑦),         
in which 𝑥 is a free variable. Let 𝑔[𝑃(𝑥)] = 𝑖, by substituting 𝑥 with 𝑖 , we can use, 
  𝑆 = 𝑃(𝒊) = ∀𝑦¬𝐺(𝒊, 𝑦)        
This is a so-called self-reflection sentence.  
 Gödel First Theorem    Neither 𝑆 nor ¬𝑆 is provable in 𝓝. 
 We now briefly sketch a proof. First, we prove that 𝑆  is not provable. Assume for 
contradiction that 𝑆 is provable, then it must have a proof, write 𝐵𝑒𝑤(𝑆), let 𝑔(𝐵𝑒𝑤(𝐿)) = 𝑗 and 
𝑔(𝑆) = 𝑖, so that 𝒢(𝑖, 𝑗) in 𝑵. By the expressibility, 𝐺(𝒊, 𝒋) must be provable in 𝓝; but 𝑆 said 
that for any 𝒋 , ¬𝐺(𝒊, 𝒋). This contradiction shows that the assumption is impossible. Hence, 𝑆 is 
not provable in 𝓝.  
 Second, we prove that ¬𝑆 is unprovable in 𝓝. Assume for contradiction that ¬𝑆 is 
provable. Then by consistency, 𝑆 is unprovable, so that for any j,  𝑔(𝐵𝑒𝑤(𝑆)) ≠ 𝑗. Hence, for any 
j, 𝒢(𝑖, 𝑗) does not hold in 𝑵; by expressibility, ¬𝐺(𝒊, 𝒋), for any  𝑗. As such, by 𝜔_𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦, 
we have ∀𝑦¬𝐺(𝒊, 𝑦), which means 𝑆 is provable in 𝓝. This contradicts to the assumption that 
𝑆 is unprovable. Thus ¬𝑆 is unprovable in 𝓝. QED- maybe define QED. 
 The above result shows that the consistency of 𝓝 is independent of 𝓝. Now let us 
speculate about what 𝑆 expresses. 𝑆 is a self-reflection sentence, it says that 𝑆 is unprovable, and 
we have just proved it above; thus, 𝑆 is true, but not provable in 𝓝, which by definition means  
that 𝓝 is incomplete. This is the well-known Gödel Incompleteness Theorem. We now turn to 
Tarski’s indefinability theorem.  
 Definition of Definability: Let 𝑔(𝑃(𝑥)) = 𝑚, and 𝑔(𝑃(𝑚)) = 𝑛, we can hold a binary 
relation 𝑑(𝑚, 𝑛) in 𝑵. Accordingly, we say 𝐷(𝒎, 𝒏) is definable in 𝓝, meaning 𝐷(𝒎, 𝒏) has a 
model, which is not null.  
 Tarski introduced a new predicate of being true, denoted by T, and he constructed a 
sentence below:  
  𝐴(𝑥) = ∀𝑦[𝐷(𝑥, 𝑦) → ¬𝑇(𝑦)] 
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Let 𝑔[𝐴(𝑥)] = 𝑚, substituting  𝑥 by 𝑚, we have 
𝐵(𝒎) = ∀𝑦[𝐷(𝒎, 𝑦) → ¬𝑇(𝑦)] 
Let 𝑔[𝐵(𝑚)] = 𝑛, we have 𝑑(𝑚, 𝑛) which holds in 𝑵; hence, 𝐷(𝑥, 𝑦) is definable in 𝓝. Then, 
by standard logic, we can infer ¬𝑇(𝑦). Now we show that T is not definable, meaning its model 
is null. Denote  𝐵(𝒎) by L. If L is pre-assumed as true, denote it by 𝐿𝑡, and write 𝐿𝑔 = 𝑔(𝐿). 
As such, we may assume for contradiction that T had a model X; 
𝑋 = { 𝐿𝑔 | 𝑋 ⊨ 𝐿, i. e. , 𝐿𝑡 is presupposed to be true under 𝑋} 
Since 𝐿𝑔 = 𝑔( 𝐿𝑡) , i.e., 𝐿𝑔 is the Gödel number of 𝐵(𝒎). By the definition of 𝑑(𝑚, 𝑛),we have 
𝑑(𝑚, 𝐿𝑔), hence 𝐷(𝒎, 𝑳𝒈) is definable in 𝓝. However, recalling the logical structure of 𝐵(𝒎),  
which is a universally quantified conditional statement, we may infer ¬𝑇(𝑳𝒈), i.e.,  𝐿𝑡 is not true 
in model 𝑋; hence, 𝑳𝒈 ∉  𝑋, which shows that 𝑋 may only be null. In other words, since T has no 
model, the truth predicate function is arithmetically undefinable. 
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